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Can direct democracy provisions improve welfare over pure representative democracy? This
paper studies how such provisions aﬀect politicians’ incentives and selection. While direct
democracy allows citizens to correct politicians’ mistakes, it also reduces the incentives of elected
representatives to search for good policies. This responsibility substitution reduces citizens’
ability to screen competent politicians, when elections are the only means to address political
agency problems. A lower cost of direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians
incentives, which we characterize by a disincentive multiplier. As a consequence, introducing
initiatives or lowering their cost can reduce voters’ expected utility. Moreover, when elections
perform well in selecting politicians and provide incentives, this indirect welfare reducing eﬀect
is stronger.
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11 Introduction
Direct democracy provisions, such as citizen initiatives, proposals, and referenda, play an important
role in regimes that are otherwise based on representative democracy. In the United States, for
instance, 377 initiatives have been proposed at state level between 1990 and 1999 and 371 between
2000 and 2008.1 In Europe, referenda have recently been used to decide on treaty adoption by
members of the European Union. Whether such direct democracy provisions improve welfare is an
ongoing debate.2
In this paper, we put aside the well-known “tyranny of the majority” argument associated with
direct democracy,3 and focus instead on another essential, yet unexplored, implication: the re-
sponsibility substitution between citizens and their representative politicians. The paper studies
how responsibility substitution modiﬁes the political agency problem between citizens and elected
politicians, politicians’ behavior, and citizens’ welfare. How severe is this substitution eﬀect?
Our analysis identiﬁes three natural conditions which, taken together, imply a potentially severe
substitution eﬀect. The ﬁrst is that politician competence aﬀects multiple aspects of policy making,
some which may be substituted for by direct democracy, and some which may not. This means,
in particular, that while citizens can correct some of the mistakes that politicians make, they
cannot fully compensate the shortcomings of an incompetent politician. The second, standard,
assumption is that the more involved a politician is on some issue, and the better citizens can
assess his competence. This assumption is reminiscent of the standard single-crossing condition
in signaling models, whereby the impact of a politician’s eﬀort on the quality of policy making is
increasing in his competence. The speciﬁc condition, however, is not a standard single-crossing
condition.4 Finally we assume that, while they have aligned preferences, citizens are unable to
commit to (or coordinate on) a punishment strategy for a low-performing politician. In our model,
citizens reelect the incumbent if and only if their expected utility is higher with him than with his
challengers, and do not take his past actions into account beyond that comparison.
Taken together, these assumptions imply that the substitution eﬀect can largely oﬀset the apparent
beneﬁt of direct democracy provisions, and can even decrease citizens’ welfare. More disturbingly,
this welfare reducing indirect eﬀect is stronger when elections are more successful in providing
1See Gerber and Matsusaka (2009).
2An example is the recent proposal to reform California’s initiative process, considered by many as partly re-
sponsible for the state’s budget crisis. Another is the attempt to add initiative and referendum provisions to the
constitution of Connecticut in the 2008 proposed Constitutional Convention.
3A famous exposition of this theory, due to Madison, is in the Federalist Papers (1788). The idea can be traced
back as far as Plato’s Republic (Book VIII).
4See Assumption 13.
2incentives and screening politicians. Understanding this result requires some model description.
The model considers two dimensions of policy making. One dimension can be amended by direct
democracy at some cost, while the other cannot. The ﬁrst period starts with an incumbent politician
who exerts privately-observed eﬀort to improve the expected quality of his (binary) decision making
along the ﬁrst dimension, and whose competence aﬀects both the cost of this eﬀort and the quality
of his decision making along the second dimension. At the end of the ﬁrst period, citizens get a
signal about the quality of the incumbent’s policy along the ﬁrst dimension. Based on their posterior
about the incumbent’s competence, they decide whether to reelect him over his challengers. If the
incumbent is reelected, his past eﬀorts carry over to the second and last period of the model.
Now suppose that, at some cost, citizens can amend the politician’s decisions along the ﬁrst dimen-
sion. This means that they care relatively less about the role of politicians on the ﬁrst dimension
and relatively more about their role on the second dimension. Hence, they care less about the
incumbent’s past eﬀorts as they do about his competence per se. Consequently, their posterior
about incumbent competence must be higher, in order for them to reelect the incumbent (that is
the “reelection posterior threshold”). This posterior is built on the politician’s equilibrium eﬀort,
which depends on his type. In equilibrium, a politician risks not being reelected only if he makes a
mistake, and citizens’ posterior conditional on a mistake determines their indiﬀerence condition for
reelection. For this posterior to be higher, the politician must have less incentive to make eﬀort.
Indeed, as one increases the politician’s incentive for searching a good policy, there is more separa-
tion across competence types, which means that a mistake makes it more likely that the politician
was incompetent. However, less search on the part of the politician means, ﬁrst, that mistakes are
more likely to occur, which involves costly correction by citizens and, second, that citizens are less
able to screen competent types. At the extreme, if citizens care only about the second dimension
(zero cost of direct democracy), the incumbent makes no eﬀort at all. As a result, citizens get no
signal whatsoever about the incumbent’s competence, which destroys their ability to use reelection
for screening competent politicians.
Moreover, having politicians that provide less search also makes them less attractive, other things
equal, relative to their challengers. This again implies that the reelection posterior threshold must
be higher, which triggers less selection and less search, and so forth. This spiral is summarized by
a disincentive multiplier, which describes how a small cost reduction in direct democracy can have
an ampliﬁed disincentive on politician’s eﬀort and selection. The size of his amplifying eﬀect is
increasing in the initial level of search. The implication is that, while direct democracy can help
’ﬁxing’ a poorly performing representative democracy, it will also prevent citizens from enjoying
the beneﬁts of an improved political process.
3This informal description of the mechanisms at play shows that cheap citizen initiatives can worsen
political agency problems and citizen’s welfare. Such eﬀects cannot occur if any of the three
key assumptions is relaxed. With commitment, for example, citizens could enforce a large range
of search level, independently of the cost of initiatives, and would only enjoy the beneﬁt from
direct democracy. Similarly, if politician abilities were not correlated across policy dimensions, the
reduced ability to screen politicians would only aﬀect those dimensions that can be directly chosen
by citizens. Finally, the relation between competence and signaling is also key.
Existing theoretical work has viewed direct democracy as an alternative regime to representative
democracy, rather than a speciﬁc set of institutions potentially featured in the latter.5 A few papers
study direct democracy in the context of a representative regime and, to our knowledge, only one –
Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) – analyzes how the presence of these institutions aﬀects the policies
chosen by elected representatives. Their analysis focuses on static agency problems and ignores
the connection between political delegation and information acquisition, which is the source of our
main results. More generally, we are unaware of any work exploring how the presence of direct
democracy aﬀects simultaneously voters’ behavior, political selection, and the overall quality of
policy-making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the key assumptions of the
paper. Section 3 analyzes the equilibria of the model and their connection to contracting. Section 4
exposes the disincentive multiplier implied by direct democracy. Section 5 studies the impact on
citizens welfare of direct democracy. Section 6 considers the impact of the cost of direct democracy
provisions on their frequency, as well as other comparative statics. Section 7 contains the literature
review, Section 8 discusses the robustness of our assumptions, and Section 9 concludes. Longer
proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Model
This section presents a simple model that contains the minimal structure needed to capture the
concepts previously introduced and present the results in the cleanest possible way.
Overview. The model has two periods. In the ﬁrst period, citizens face an incumbent politician
of privately-known competence whose only goal is to be reelected for a second term. Before the
election, the incumbent chooses some costly eﬀort to learn a state ˜ h ∈ {h,h′} that aﬀects citizens’
utility in the ﬁrst period. Upon observing a signal about the state, the incumbent chooses either the
default policy, x, or a reform, x′. Citizens then observe the policy and the state and decide, based
5Examples include Maskin and Tirole (2004), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Loeper (2008).
4on these observations, whether to reelect the incumbent or to elect a challenger. In the second and
ﬁnal period, a new independently distributed state of the world arises, which the elected politician
makes no additional eﬀort to learn. However, if the incumbent is reelected, his past eﬀorts are
valuable also in the second period, which we simply model as a second-period signal with the same
accuracy as in the ﬁrst period.6 The politician then chooses some policy in {x,x′}. Finally, citizens
observe the state of the second period and the policy and decide, if needed, to amend it at some
cost µ.
The state of nature ˜ h at each period is independently drawn from the following distribution:
˜ h ∼
 
h 1 − ρ
h′ ρ
˜ h describes all elements determining how the policy x or x′ aﬀects citizens; examples include the
cost of providing a public good or the transaction cost associated with a certain redistribution
scheme. We assume that when ˜ h = h, it is optimal for voters to have x implemented, while they
prefer x′ when ˜ h = h′.
A politician (either incumbent or challenger) is competent (θ = C) with probability 1 − q and
incompetent (θ = N) with probability q. Incumbent and challengers have independently distributed
types.
The incumbent has an outside option Oθ, which depends on his competence θ. The incumbent
decides whether or not to run for reelection, trading-oﬀ the expected payoﬀ of running for reelection
(net of eﬀort cost) and the outside option. If he runs for reelection (e = 1), the incumbent may
perform a costly search to determine ˜ h. More speciﬁcally, a search eﬀort s costs the incumbent Tθ(s)
and reveals state h′ with probability s, while revealing nothing otherwise. Thus, the incumbent
knows that ˜ h = h′ if revelation occurred, and uses Bayesian updating to assess ˜ h conditional on no
revelation.7
If the incumbent is reelected, he receives a rent R in the second-period. Otherwise, a challenger
whose type distribution is identical to the incumbent’s is elected.
6One could model this “learning by doing” with a less informative signal in the second period, without aﬀecting
the results.
7This choice of an asymmetric search signal structure simpliﬁes the analysis and can be modiﬁed without aﬀecting
the main results of the paper. The choice of this asymmetric signal structure is, as we will see later, motivated by
making the model simpler. It follows, among others, B´ enabou and Tirole (2006), who employ a similar idea in the
diﬀerent context of a model of endogenous belief formation about society’s fairness. A similar signal structure is also
employed in Tirole (2009).
5If, instead, the incumbent chooses the outside option (e = 0), he gets a payoﬀ of Oθ, the policy is
left at the default level x and the challenger becomes the incumbent in period 2 via an uncontested
election.
The cost function Tθ(s) is increasing, continuous, and convex in s, vanishes at 0, and is such that
T′
θ(0) = 0 and T′
θ(1) ≥ ρR for both types θ. Moreover, we assume that the competent type has a
higher marginal productivity of search eﬀort:
Assumption 1 (Single Crossing)
T′
N(s) > T′
C(s) ∀ s > 0
The next assumption states that the diﬀerential in responsiveness across types increases with the
strength of the electoral incentives:













  is weakly decreasing in z.
This assumption implies that as the marginal gain from search eﬀort (the electoral incentive)
increases, the ratio of search intensities of competent and incompetent types increases. Therefore,
by inducing higher search from both types, voters are able make a better inference on the type of
the incumbent. The assumptions implies that, when both types are searching, C is not only more
productive, but also more responsive than N to the electoral incentive. Next, we assume that the
outside option is higher for the C-type, normalizing to zero the one of the N-type. We also require
that, at least in some circumstances (depending on voters behavior), the C-type might actually
prefer OC over running for reelection.
Assumption 3 (Outside Option) ON = 0 and
OC > max
s∈[0,1]
R(1 − ρ) + Rρs − TC(s) (1)
This outside option ensures uniqueness of an equilibrium with positive search,8 and rules out the
implausible ﬁrst-best equilibrium where politicians make maximal eﬀort. OC can be interpreted as
a market premium for political competence in the private sector. The second part of the assumption
states that a competent incumbent prefers his outside option over a regime where voters reelect the
8Precisely, it guarantees uniqueness of a “natural” equilibrium with positive search. See Section 3.
6incumbent only when he chooses the optimal policy. This imposes an upper bound on the pressure
that voters can put on the incumbent.9
Finally, we introduce an assumption that acts as a “political linkage” across periods.
Assumption 4 (Learning by doing) In period 2, a reelected politician who previously exerted
eﬀort s is able to discover the state h′ with probability s at no additional cost.
This assumption is needed to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with strictly positive eﬀort in
the ﬁrst period.10 It captures the fact that, if the incumbent exerts eﬀort today, he will accumulate
experience and additional competence that can be used in the future. The results derived in the
paper are easily shown to be hold with a weaker version of this assumption in which only a fraction
of the previous search eﬀort is exerted at no cost in Period 2. Alternatively, the assumption can be
replaced by the introduction of correlation11 across periods between the draws of ˜ h.
This set of assumptions implies that when the challenger is in oﬃce in period 2, s = 0. It also
implies that a politician who exerted s = s∗ in Period 1 and gets reelected, s = s∗ will be exerted
in Period 2.
2.1 Voters
Without initiatives, voters have the same utility function at each Period t ∈ {1,2}: If policy ˜ x is
chosen at Period t and the state of the world for that period is ˜ h, their utility for that period is
Ut = U(˜ x;˜ h) + I{θ=C}M.
Their total payoﬀ U = U1 + U2.12
M is the “valence” of a competent politician (with zero valence for an incompetent one), and
represents how competence aﬀects policy dimensions other than the one which may be directly
9Diﬀerent versions of Assumption 3 have been employed in the literature on political selection. Mattozzi and
Merlo (2008), Messner and Polborn (2004), and Caselli and Morelli (2004), among others, assume that productivity
in a political job is positively correlated with productivity in a private sector job.
10To see why, intuitively, suppose on the contrary that past eﬀort has no impact on the second period. Then,
voters reelect the incumbent if and only if their posterior is higher than the challenger’s expected competence. If
the incumbent puts strictly positive eﬀort, any mistake makes voters strictly more pessimistic about the incumbent’s
type and prompts them to surely elect a challenger. In such case, a competent incumbent prefers his outside option,
and the equilibrium unravels.
11What is important is that exerting eﬀort in period 1 gives the incumbent a superior information over the challenger
for the policy-making in period 2. This information advantage is the reason why voters care about past eﬀort when
choosing the future policy-maker.
12One could introduce a discount factor across periods without aﬀecting the results.
7aﬀected by direct democracy. For example, M may be the expected relative payoﬀ that a C-type
provides voters by better handling unforeseen contingencies (for example, a terroristic attack or a
ﬁnancial crisis) with respect to a N-type. Since competence is unobserved, voters are unable to
perceive M until period 2.13
The payoﬀ from default policy x is normalized to zero for all states of nature, U(x;h) = U(x;h′) = 0,
with the net beneﬁt of a reform being captured by U(x′;h′) = ∆ > 0 and U(x′;h) = −∆′ < 0.
Equivalently. ∆ is the relative loss of not implementing a reform when it is needed (political
inertia), and ∆′ is the loss associated with an unnecessary reform. We assume that reforms are ex
ante not desirable:
ρ∆ < (1 − ρ)∆′. (2)
In particular, it is eﬃcient to choose x′ only if a signal about state h′ has been observed.
If the incumbent chooses to run for oﬃce, citizens make a reelection decision after observing the
state ˜ h and the implemented policy. Voters’ reelection strategy consists of a reelection probability
f(˜ h, ˜ x) for each pair (˜ h, ˜ x) of state and policy.
In Period 2, the elected politician, possibly after observing a signal about the new state of nature,
chooses a second policy. A newly elected politician makes no eﬀort (s = 0) and chooses the default
policy x. In contrast, if the incumbent politician is reelected, he learns the new state of the world
h′ with probability sθ, which is his eﬀort level in the ﬁrst period. Thus, the incumbent’s past eﬀort
carries over to the second period, resulting in the same signal accuracy that depends on that past
eﬀort, and hence on the equilibrium search level of the ﬁrst period. This implies that a reelected
incumbent will provide higher policy quality if he is competent.
2.2 Initiatives
In existing economic models,14 representative democracy has been compared to direct democracy
in its purest form, namely a situation in which citizens are directly choosing policies without
the presence of elected politicians. It is quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd, in modern societies, examples of
communities where decisions are always made via special elections and political representation is
absent. In our model, elected representatives are present and exert sovereignty, but the policy can
be amended by citizens via ballot initiatives.
Citizens can propose an initiative in Period 2. An initiative is the process of calling a special
13Under the attack/crisis interpretation, it is enough that M is not perceived, with positive probability, before the
election.
14See Maskin & Tirole (2004) and Persson & Tabellini (1994).
8election in which voters have the possibility of amending the default policy (x) with a reform
(x′).15 Proposing an initiative has a per capita cost of µ, which all voters should pay. An initiative
is proposed (and accepted) if and only if µ ≤ ∆.
In our model, “adding citizen initiatives” is tantamount to reducing the cost µ of initiatives below
∆.
In representative democracy (µ ≥ ∆), if a politician of type θ who chose eﬀort sθ gets reelected,
voters’ expected utility in Period 2 equals Ur(θ) = sθ∆ρ+Iθ=CM. If a challenger is elected, voters’
expected utility in Period 2 equals Ur
c = (1 − q)M. With direct democracy (µ < ∆), the expected
second-period utility associated to a θ-type is Ud(θ) = sθ∆ρ + (1 − sθ)(∆ − µ)ρ + Iθ=CM. If a
challenger is elected, the expected utility for voters is given by Ud
c = (1 − q)M + ρ(∆ − µ). The
assumption that ρ∆ < (1 − q)M implies that
Ur(C) > Ur
c > Ur(N) (3)
and
Ud(C) > Ud
c > Ud(N) (4)
for all levels of sC and sN. These two last relations are important: they imply that if voters knew
for sure that the incumbent was competent, they would strictly prefer to reelect him, no matter
how little eﬀort he put in the past, while if they knew for sure that the incumbent was incompetent,
they would strictly prefer to oust him, no matter how much eﬀort he put in the ﬁrst period.
A lower initiatives cost makes voters relatively less concerned about search and relatively more
concerned about political selection, keeping the payoﬀ M constant.
In the remaining of the paper, we assume that
µ ≤ ∆
µ = ∆ corresponds to pure representative democracy (since there is no gain in amending policy),
while µ < ∆ implies that citizens strictly beneﬁt (ex post) from amending the policy.
3 Equilibrium and Political Contract
In this model, the “natural policy” is to implement the reform if and only if the state h′ is revealed.
Citizens’s ideal would be for politicians to put maximal search eﬀort (i.e., s = 1), followed the
15In principle, we could allow citizens to amend a reform x
′ into x. However, such mistake never occurs in
equilibrium, because politicians choose x
′ only if they know that the state is h
′.
9natural policy. In the present setting, there are three possible kinds of equilibria. There always
exists a “no search” equilibrium, in which the incumbent puts no eﬀort, hence revealing nothing
about his type, and is reelected by citizens, who are indiﬀerent between him and his challenger.
This equilibrium is suboptimal, whenever an equilibrium with positive search exists.
The most natural type of equilibrium, when it exists, is one in which citizens surely reelect the
incumbent whenever he got the policy right, i.e., chose x when the state was h and x′ when the state
was h′, and punish him when he made a mistake. Assuming for now that the incumbent follows
the natural policy, the only mistake that happens in equilibrium is to choose the default option x
when the state was h′. Punishment takes the form of a lower reelection probability conditional on a
mistake happening. In equilibrium, that reelection probability must be such that it induces just the
right amount of eﬀort from both incumbent types so that, conditional on the mistake happening,
voters are indeed indiﬀerent between reelecting the incumbent or not. Such type of equilibrium is
characterized by a single number, the probability f of reelection conditional on observing (h′,x).
Finally, there exists a “mirror equilibrium” in which the politician does the exact opposite of what
his signal tells him to do, i.e., chooses x′ if he does not learn the state, and x if h′ is revealed.
That equilibrium is clearly suboptimal for voters. However, because that behavior does reveal the
incumbent’s type, and because citizens highly value competence and lack commitment power, they
will reelect the incumbent with high enough prior despite this suboptimal policy.
We focus on the natural kind of equilibrium, which maximizes welfare within the class of all self-
enforcing contracts that citizens, who lack commitment, can propose to politicians.
In the rest of this section, we show that there exists exactly one positive-search equilibrium of this
kind, provided that the gain from searching, ∆ is high enough. We characterize this equilibrium,
and also verify that it is indeed welfare maximizing within the class of self-enforcing contracts.
3.1 Reelection probabilities
Let ¯ p denote the probability threshold for incumbent competence, given search eﬀorts sC,sN and
conditional on observing mistake (h′,x), above which voters reelect the incumbent. This competence
posterior threshold depends on search eﬀorts because those eﬀorts carry over to the second period
(learning-by-doing). The next proposition characterizes this threshold.
Proposition 1 After observing (˜ h, ˜ x), voters strictly prefer to reelect the incumbent if and only if
their actual posterior p(˜ h, ˜ x) satisﬁes
p(˜ h, ˜ x) > ¯ pr =
(1 − q)M − sNµρ
M + µρ(sC(σV ) − sN(σV ))
,
10and are indiﬀerent across all reelection probabilities if p(˜ h, ˜ x) = ¯ pr.
Proof. Voters’ expected second-period utility from reelecting the incumbent, given posterior p is
p[M + ρsC∆ + ρ(1 − sC)(∆ − µ)] + (1 − p)[ρsN∆ + ρ(1 − sN)(∆ − µ)],
while their expected second-period utility with a challenger is (1 − q)M. Comparing these expres-
sions yields the threshold. ￿
3.2 Incumbent’s Choice
The incumbent’s strategy in the ﬁrst period consists of the following dimensions:
• Whether to run for reelection e ∈ {0,1}. We allow randomization and let λ = Pr[e = 1].
• Search eﬀort s ∈ [0,1]
• Policy y upon receiving no signal.
• Policy y′ upon learning that the state of the world is h′.










+ (1 − e)Oθ
The incompetent type always runs for reelection, since his outside option is zero. In any equilibrium
with positive search, the competent type must also run with positive probability λ > 0. Otherwise,
voters would know the incumbent’s incompetence conditional on his running for reelection, and
would not reelect him, independently of his equilibrium search level (see (3)). Thus the running
type would optimally choose zero eﬀort.








In particular, sθ is independent from f(h,x) and f(h,x′).
3.3 Optimal Self-Enforcing Political Contract
We show that implementing “natural policy” where the incumbent implements the reform if and
only if he learns the state h′, is optimal from voters’ viewpoint, and that an optimal implementation
11is to surely reelect the incumbent if he does not make any mistake, randomize reelection if he chose
the default option when reform was needed, and punish him with certain ousting if he made the
other type of mistake.
Suppose that an equilibrium with positive search exists, with f(h,x) = f(h′,x′) = 1 f(h,x′) = 0
and f(h′,x) ∈ [0,1). We will see that there exists exactly one such equilibrium, provided that µ is
high enough. That equilibrium clearly dominates any no-search equilibrium from voters’ viewpoint.
We now show that this equilibrium is optimal among all possible equilibria inducing positive search.
Thus, consider any equilibrium that induces some positive search.
First, consider voters’ reelection strategy conditional on observing h. In that case, the incumbent
has surely not received any signal about h′. In that situation, therefore, the incompetent type can
always mimic the competent type, so no type revelation can occur. Given that no type separation
can occur, the best voters can hope for is for the incumbent to choose the optimal strategy condi-
tional on this information set, which is to take action x (since that action is ex ante optimal, and
a fortiori optimal conditional on not receiving any signal that the state is h′). Moreover, voters
want to reelect the incumbent, other things equal, because i) their posterior about his competence
is the same as their belief about challengers’ competence, and ii) the incumbent has the strict
advantage, compared to challengers, of having performed positive eﬀort, which carries over to the
second period. Therefore, an optimal strategy is to set f(h,x) = 1 and f(h,x′) = 0, as it achieves
exactly this.16
Now consider the case where the state is h′. In that case, ignoring separating considerations, voters
want the incumbent to choose the reform x′ if he learned the state. Thus, abstracting for now
from the adverse selection problem, voters would want the incumbent to choose x′ if and only
if he received the signal. We now take into account adverse selection. In any equilibrium with
positive search, the competent type searches more than the incompetent type, since it is less costly
for him to do so. Therefore, implementing the natural policy not only is optimal from voters’
myopic viewpoint, but also increases the probability of selecting a more competent type. Thus,
setting f(h′,x′) = 1 is optimal. The remaining probability f(h′,x) is pinned down by equilibrium
conditions. The case where no positive search equilibrium exists is included, by setting f(h′,x) = 1,
in which case the incumbent is always reelected if he chooses the default action x.
We have shown the following.
Proposition 2 (Natural Positive-Search Equilibrium) Any welfare maximizing self-enforcing
16Setting f(h,x
′) small enough would also yield an optimal strategy, provided that the incumbent follows the
“natural policy,” since (h,x
′) does not arise on the equilibrium path.
12political contract can be implemented by setting f(h,x) = f(h′,x′) = 1 and f(h,x′) = 0. The re-
maining reelection probability f = f(h′,x) ∈ [0,1] is determined by equilibrium conditions.
For natural equilibria, equilibrium search then equals
sθ(f) := T′−1
θ [[1 − f]ρR]. (5)
Convexity of T implies that sθ(f) is decreasing in f. The single crossing property of Tθ(·) implies
that sC(f) ≥ sN(f) for all f.
In our setting, there may exist two kinds of natural equilibria. We call “interior equilibrium” one
in which the competent type surely runs for reelection λ = 1, and “constrained equilibrium” one in
which the outside option of the incumbent type is binding, and where he runs for reelection with
probability λ < 1 and takes his outside option with the remaining probability. The incumbent’s
outside option prevents equilibria where a mistake is punished by certain ousting.
Proposition 3 (Reelection and Search Bounds) The competent type runs for reelection only
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sN ≤ ¯ sN and sC ≤ ¯ sC,
where ¯ sN = sN(f
¯
) and ¯ sC = sC(f
¯
).
Proof. The expected payoﬀ for a competent incumbent who runs for reelection and chooses eﬀort
s is, assuming that f(h,x) = f(h′,x′) = 1,
R(1 − ρ) + Rρs + Rρ(1 − s)f − TC(s).
The objective is increasing in f and submodular in s and f, implying that the optimal search level
is decreasing in f and that the maximum is increasing in f. Running for reelection is optimal if and
only if the maximum is higher than OC. Therefore, running for reelection is optimal if and only if
f ≥ f
¯
. The bound also holds if f(h,x) and/or f(h′,x′) are strictly less than one, as it reduces the
value of eﬀort even more. The rest of the proposition follows from the previous analysis. ￿
Corollary 1 In any equilibrium with positive search, f(h′,x) ≥ f
¯
.
Proof. Suppose that f(h′,x) < f
¯
. Then, the competent incumbent does not run for reelection.
This implies that an incumbent who runs for reelection immediately reveals himself as incompetent.
However, in that case voters do not reelect him, which is a direct consequence of (4) ￿
13Thus, voters cannot use a “tough” strategy, where the mistake (h′,x) is punished by a very likely
removal from oﬃce, as this would create a lemons problem where only incompetent types would
seek oﬃce for a second term and, hence, immediately reveal themselves as incompetent.
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Proposition 4 (Equilibrium) If µ ≤ µ1, there is no equilibrium with positive search. If µ1 <
µ ≤ µ2, there is a unique equilibrium with positive search. Both types surely run for reelection, and
the reelection probability f∗ conditional on (h′,x) solves
sN(f∗)[1 + φ1] − s2
N(f∗)φ1 = sC(f∗)[1 − φ2] + s2
C(f∗)φ2. (9)




1 − ¯ sN[1 + φ1] + φ1¯ s2
N
  
1 − ¯ sC[1 − φ2] − φ2¯ s2
C
 −1 (10)
and the reelection probability conditional on (h′,x) is f
¯
.
The proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For ﬁxed parameter values, there exists at most one equilibrium with λ = 1 (competent
type enters surely) and at most one equilibrium with λ ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, these equilibria cannot
coexist.
Proof. If λ = 1, equilibrium search solves
(1 − q)(1 − sC)
(1 − q)(1 − sC) + q(1 − sN)
= ¯ p =
(1 − q)M − µρsN
M + µρ(sC − sN)
.
which can be reexpressed as
a(f) = b(f), (11)
where
a(f) = sN(f)[1 + φ1] − s2
N(f)φ1
and
b(f) = sC(f)[1 − φ2] + s2
C(f)φ2.
14If λ ∈ (0,1), equilibrium search solves
(1 − q)(1 − sC)λ
(1 − q)λ(1 − sC) + q(1 − sN)
= ¯ p,
which becomes
1 − ¯ sN(1 + φ1) + ¯ s2
Nφ1 = λ
 




Since (12) entirely pins down λ, there can exist at most one constrained equilibrium. Since each






It is easy to show that a is decreasing in f, and that b is either everywhere decreasing in f or ﬁrst
decreasing and then increasing.18 An equilibrium f is a root of the function a − b. We show that
the function a−b is strictly quasiconcave (i.e., strictly increasing, then strictly decreasing). Let fb
denote the (possibly, equal to 1) value of f such that b is decreasing on [0,fb] and increasing on
[fb,1]. Since a is decreasing, the function a − b is decreasing on [fb,1]. To conclude the proof of
quasiconcavity, it suﬃces to show that if a − b is decreasing around any value f < fb, then it is
decreasing on [f,1]. For f < fb, we have a′(f),b′(f) negative, and
a′(f)
b′(f)
= κ((1 − f)ρR)
(1 + φ1) − 2sN(f)φ1
1 − φ2 + 2sC(f)φ2
,
which is increasing in f, since κ is decreasing by assumption and 1 − φ2 + 2sC(f)φ2 is positive
(since b′ is negative). Now suppose that (a − b)′( ˆ f) ≤ 0 for any ˆ f < fb. Then, a′/b′( ˆ f) > 1 and
hence a′/b′(f) > 1 and (a − b)′(f) < 0 for all f ∈ ( ˆ f,fb). In particular, given that a(1) − b(1) = 0,
the function a−b can only cross the x-axis once, and it does so from below. This shows that there
exists at most one level of f for which (11) holds and, therefore, at most one interior equilibrium.




). If a( ˆ f) = b( ˆ f) for some ˆ f ∈ (f
¯
,1), strict quasi-concavity implies
that a(f) < b(f) for all f > ˆ f, contradicting the fact that a(1) = b(1). This shows that (11)
and (13) cannot hold together. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemma 1 shows that exactly three cases are possible: i) no equilibrium
with positive search, ii) an equilibrium with λ = 1, and iii) an equilibrium with λ < 1. There
remains to identify which of these cases holds, depending on parameter values. Existence of an
17Indeed, the left-hand side may be rewritten as (1− ¯ sN)(1−φ1¯ sN), which is positive, with a similar factorization
for the right-hand side.
18Seen as a function of sN, a is a quadratic concave polynomial that reaches its peak at (1 + φ1)/(2φ1) > 1.
Therefore, a is increasing in sN on [0,1] and, therefore, decreasing in f. Similarly, b is a quadratic convex polynomial
in sC, whose minimizer sb is always strictly less than 1, and is negative if φ2 < 1. Therefore there exists fb such that
sC(f) is in the increasing range of b if and only if f > fb.
15interior equilibrium obtains if and only if (11) is satisﬁed for some f ∈ (f
¯
,1). Since a(1) = b(1) = 0
and a′(f)/b′(f) is increasing in f, a necessary condition the existence of f < 1 such that a(f) = b(f)
is that a′(1)/b′(1) ≥ 1. Otherwise, b′(f) < a′(f) < 0 for all f (recalling that a,b are decreasing)
and, therefore, a(f) > b(f) for all f < 1. Using that a′(1)/b′(1) = κ(0)(1 + φ1)/(1 − φ2), we get
the condition µ ≥ µ1.
An equilibrium with λ < 1 exists if and only if (13) holds. Using the deﬁnitions of φ1 and φ2,
this is equivalent to µ > µ2. In conclusion, if µ > µ2 there exists a constrained equilibrium. If




). If µ > µ1, we
have a′(1)/b′(1) > 1 and, more precisely a′(1) < b′(1) < 0. Since a(1) = b(1), this implies that





by continuity of the functions a,b that there exists some f ∈ (f
¯
,1) such that a(f) = b(f), which
shows the existence of an equilibrium with λ = 1, whenever µ > µ1 and µ < µ2. To conclude, we





implies that µ > µ1, since we also saw that in the opposite case a(f) > b(f) for all f < 1. ￿
4 Selection and Disincentive Multiplier
How well does the election ﬁlter out incompetent politicians? The incumbent risks not being
reelected if he made a mistake. The only kind of mistake that may occur in equilibrium is (h′,x):
the incumbent chooses the default policy when the reform is needed. Ideally, voters would like
such mistake to reveal, as much as possible, an incompetent type. The separating power of the
electoral process is its ability to weed out only incompetent politicians. This is measured by the
posterior probability p(h′,x) that the incumbent be competent conditional on observing (h′,x):
the lower that posterior, and the more powerful the electoral process. The next proposition shows
that this posterior is decreasing with electoral incentives: the lower the probability f of reelection
conditional on the mistake (h′,x), and the lower the probability of weeding out a competent type.
Let p(f) =
(1−q)(1−sC(f))
(1−q)(1−sC(f))+q(1−sN(f)) denote the probability that the incumbent is competent, con-
ditional on (h′,x). The proof of the next proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 i) p(f) is increasing in f.
ii) sC(f) − sN(f) is decreasing in f.
The equilibrium condition for the interior equilibrium is that f solves
(1 − q)
(1 − q) + qτ(f)
=
(1 − q)M − µρsN(f)







and sC,sN are the equilibrium search levels of both types of incumbent given reelection disincentive
f. Let f(µ) denote the solution of (11), which we have shown to be unique.
The left-hand side of (14) is the posterior probability that the incumbent be competent, conditional
on making a mistake. It is decreasing in τ.
The right-hand side is the posterior level at which voters are indiﬀerent between reelecting the
incumbent and electing a challenger, given i) equilibrium search levels sN(f) and sC(f) that the
incumbent has chosen depending on his type, and ii) the cost µ of correcting mistakes in the second
period. The right-hand side is decreasing in µ.
What is the eﬀect of decreasing the cost µ of direct democracy? A lower cost of direct democracy
makes voters more demanding, in terms of the posterior, to reelect the incumbent, because they
care more about competence per se and less about the value of past eﬀort (since they can amend
mistakes at lower cost). Other things equal, thus, τ must decrease: the equilibrium posterior
conditional on a mistake must increase, in order to keep voters indiﬀerent. We have shown in part
i) of Proposition 5 that τ(f) is decreasing in f. Therefore, f must increase in equilibrium. The
intuition is that, to achieve a higher posterior conditional on a mistake, the incumbent must have
searched less, which is possible only if the search disincentive f is higher.
From part ii) of Proposition 5, a higher f implies that sN(f) and sC(f) − sN(f) decrease. Other
things equal, this increases the right-hand side of (14), which must again be oﬀset by a lower τ,
hence a higher f, and so forth.
Therefore, the impact of a lower direct democracy cost has a spiraling negative eﬀect on electoral
incentives.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium reelection probability for two values of µ associated with an
interior equilibrium. The solid lines are obtained from a value of µ twice as large as the one
generating the dotted lines. As argued earlier, as the cost of direct democracy decreases, the
responsibility substitution makes voters more willing to reelect an incumbent who mistakenly chose
the status quo policy over the reform.
5 Welfare, Direct Democracy, and Political Agency
This section studies the impact of direct democracy on citizens’ welfare. Starting from represen-
























Figure 1: Equilibrium Reelection Probabilities for µ = 50 (solid lines) and µ = 25 (dashed lines).
Other parameter values: M = 100, ρ = 0.8, q = 0.56.
as µ decreases. As we know from the previous analysis, there are two cases to consider: when
representative democracy is in an interior equilibrium (µ1 < ∆ ≤ µ2,) and when representative
democracy is in a constrained equilibrium (∆ > µ2).19
Let EU(µ) denote the expected utilities under direct democracy when the cost is µ. If EU(∆) ≥
EU(µ) it means that direct democracy at cost µ reduces citizens’ ex ante welfare, compare to pure
representative democracy.
For the following proposition, let λ(∆) denote the equilibrium participation probability of a compe-
tent incumbent (see (10)) and let s∗
(θ) denote equilibrium search under pure representative democ-
racy. Moreover, call the possibility of direct democracy with µ = 0 costless amendment.
Proposition 6 Costless amendments reduce citizens welfare in the following cases:
19When ∆ < µ1, the incumbent makes no search eﬀort. Therefore, direct democracy only has a direct, beneﬁcial
impact.
18i) If qs∗
N + (1 − q)s∗
C > 1
2.
ii) If q¯ sN + (1 − q)λ(∆)¯ sC >
1+q(1−λ(∆))
2φ1 .
The proposition means that, when expected equilibrium search is high enough, costless direct
democracy reduces ex ante welfare. The result is driven by the responsibility substitution eﬀect.
Decreasing the cost of direct democracy has two eﬀects on welfare: a direct eﬀect on the cost
associated with the lack of a reform, which occurs with probability (1-expected search) and goes
from ∆ to µ, and an indirect eﬀect on equilibrium search, through responsibility substitution. High
initial search makes the direct eﬀect small, while allowing the responsibility substitution eﬀect
to operate over a larger portion of the domain. This latter fact implies that direct democracy
is likely to improve citizens’ welfare only when the initial quality of the political process is low.
As politicians’ search technologies improve, or voters become able to credibly commit to tougher
punishment strategies, then direct democracy prevents these improvements to result in higher
equilibrium search and better selection because the responsibility substitution becomes stronger.
In a constrained equilibrium, decreasing µ slightly below ∆ makes voters slightly less hurt by the lack
of a reform vis-´ a-vis political selection. This implies that the reelection posterior threshold should
increase, which means that λ must go up. In other words, there is a “selection complementarity”
that makes the C-type more likely to run for reelection in equilibrium. Therefore, as long as
µ ≤ µ2, the intuition suggests that initiatives should be beneﬁcial. As µ goes below µ2, λ = 1 and
equilibrium search will start decreasing, as the equilibrium will become interior. As a result, if the
initial λ is close enough to one20, costless initiatives will be welfare reducing as average search will
be large enough to oﬀset the direct eﬀect.
Proposition 6 has compared two extremes: no direct democracy provision vs. costless direct democ-
racy provision. The next proposition shows a stronger result. It provides conditions under which
citizens welfare is increasing in µ over the entire domain [µ1,µ2].
Proposition 7 When κ is constant and ∆ ≤ µ2, EU(µ) is strictly increasing on (µ1,∆].
A parameterized family of cost functions where κ is constant is the following one: Tθ(s) = α(θ)sβ,
with α > 0 is decreasing in competence, and where β > 1 guarantees convexity of the cost function.
This family includes, for example, quadratic cost functions, scaled by a competence factor. That
additional assumption acts as a regularity condition on the derivative of the welfare function with
respect to the cost and allows to establish a uniform monotonicity result that is otherwise not
guaranteed when κ is highly responsive to the electoral incentives.
20 that is ∆ is close enough to µ2
19In our model, then, initiatives improve welfare only in the following circumstances: when search in
representative democracy was already low, when the separating power of elections is exceptionally
high, and when elections have become completely unsuccessful in both selecting politicians and
providing them with incentives to search.
The situation in which µ < µ1 very interesting on a empirical level, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the
real-world analog of µ can be lowered up to a certain level: together with legal 21 costs, chosen by
the constitution, there are technological costs associated with proposing an initiative (legislative
knowledge required to write a bill, mobilizing voters, organizing a special election) that cannot be
arbitrarily lowered. Second, and more generally, µ < µ1 implies that voters can basically exert direct
policy making at a lower cost than using representative democracy, since the informational eﬀort
exerted by politicians has basically a negative social value. Therefore, representative democracy
itself is unnecessary in this case. Additionally, a very rapidly decreasing κ(µ) is also relatively
unrealistic, since more and more phases of the policymaking process have become largely delegated
to bureaucracies, thereby making the signal extraction problem relatively more sophisticated.
Figures 2 and 3 plot EU(µ) in the two types of initial equilibria for the simple quadratic cost
function case.22
To summarize, when there is a complementarity between voters’ payoﬀs and improved selection
(constrained equilibrium) initiatives can be beneﬁcial if the cost of proposing them preserves these
complementarities.
When there is a substitutability between voters’ payoﬀs and eﬀort (constrained equilibrium) initia-
tives reduce equilibrium search; this eﬀect is likely to be welfare decreasing and is stronger when the
initial equilibrium search is higher. This result is somewhat surprising as, in our setting, initiatives
are ex–post welfare improving. In this model initiatives are immune from their standard drawbacks
(tyranny of the majority, interest groups). Nevertheless, initiatives can lead, owing to the disin-
centive multiplier, to a signiﬁcant reduction of politicians incentives for eﬀort and, consequently, of
citizens’ ability to select competent politicians.
6 Comparative Statics: Frequency of Initiatives, Optimality of
Reforms, and Politician Competence
In this section we show how various comparative static of the model can be used to suggest that
empirical evidence is consistent with the interior equilibrium, that changes in various parameters
21signature requirements for petition, geographical representation requirements










Figure 2: Welfare from Direct Democracy as a function of µ: Interior Equilibrium case.
might change the welfare eﬀect of direct democracy, and that initiatives are more likely to be welfare
reducing when the expected competence of politicians improves (i.e. goes from low to moderate).
6.1 Frequency of initiatives
Our model yields predictions concerning the probability of observing initiatives, or in an empirical
context, about the frequency at which they occur. As it turns out, the two types of equilibria
studied in earlier sections, interior and constrained, yield diﬀerent predictions about the frequency of
initiatives, which provides a way to distinguish them. When the equilibrium is constrained, a lower
cost µ results in a higher probability of the competent type running for reelection. Therefore, we
would conjecture that the presence of complementarities might decrease the frequency of initiatives
precisely because the need of using them is lower. When the equilibrium is interior, one would
suspect that lowering µ worsens both search eﬀort and political selection through the responsibility
substitution, which translates into an increased need of using direct democracy. On the other hand,
lowering µ also decreases the probability that a challenger will be elected, thereby decreasing the
chances of observing initiatives.
The question basically becomes empirically distinguishing between interior and constrained equi-










Figure 3: Welfare from Direct Democracy as a function of µ: Constrained Equilibrium case.
connecting its insights to what happened in the last century to direct democracy institutions in
United States, and possibly suggest an interpretation for these facts.
The following proposition conﬁrms this intuition. In our model the ex ante probability of observing
an initiative can be interpreted as the expected frequency.
Proposition 8 i)The expected frequency in an interior equilibrium is constant in [0,µ1] and, if
expected search is responsive enough to f, decreasing in (µ1,∆].
ii) The expected frequency in a constrained equilibrium is increasing.
In the appendix, we give a precise meaning to the condition that expected search, that is qsN(f)+
(1 − q)sC(f), must satisfy. We also show that for a simple quadratic cost functions the condition
holds. Proposition 8 implies that an inverse relationship between cost and frequency can only
be compatible with an interior equilibrium with positive search, a situation in which reducing µ
decreases voters’ expected utility.
The massive increase in the frequency of initiatives that has occurred in the last 3 decades in
United States can be interpreted in light of this ﬁnding. The reason is that all evidence available
suggests that the cost of proposing an initiative in the last 3 decades has also fallen. On one
hand, improvements in IT have decreased the ”technological” component of µ, in a period in
which, especially in western states (California, Oregon), the number of initiatives has been steadily
increasing. A thorough discussion of this fact is beyond the scope of this paper, but several authors
22have highlighted this mechanism (see, for example, Matsusaka (2005)). On the other hand, the
data suggest that in the last few decades the ”legal” component of the cost of initiatives also seems
to be negatively related to the frequency of initiatives. This relationship is featured in several other
theoretical contributions and, more important, is supported by empirical evidence. One of the
predictions of the model in Matsusaka and McCarty (2004) is that the cost (deﬁned and interpreted
as µ here) of proposing initiatives should be negatively related to their frequency. In their empirical
analysis the authors show, using data from 22 states between 1953 to 1993, that the frequency of
initiatives is negatively related to two key variables related to µ: the signature requirement for the
petition23 and a dummy indicating whether the state law requires some geographic dispersion in
the signatures24. The empirical ﬁndings in Gerber (1996) also go in the same direction: in states in
which popular opinion and existing policies on parental consent requirement for teenage abortion
are divergent, having a higher signature requirements signiﬁcantly lowers the likelihood of having
an initiative on the subject.
6.2 Higher probability of a reform being optimal
In this subsection we analyze the eﬀect on the equilibrium of a change in ρ, the probability of a
reform being optimal. A higher ρ makes, everything else equal, voters to care relatively more about
policies. Therefore, we would conjecture that increasing ρ would make complementarities more
likely to arise. This intuition is only partially true. The reason is that ρ also impacts the strength
of the electoral incentive that the incumbent faces: increasing ρ makes both types more responsive
to changes in the search disincentive f. This might lead to non trivial consequences on the welfare
comparison. The following proposition describes the impact of ρ more precisely.
Proposition 9 i) An increase in ρ in an interior equilibrium increases search through two chan-
nels: a lower equilibrium f and a higher
dsθ(f)
df θ ∈ C,N. This second eﬀect remains even when the
equilibrium is constrained (through lower µ2).
ii) Both µ1 and µ2 are decreasing in ρ.
This proposition basically states that an increase of the probability of a reform being optimal
has two eﬀects: it makes the policy component of voters’ payoﬀ relatively higher, thereby making
constrained equilibria more likely. On the other hand, it also makes the incumbent ceteris paribus
more responsive to electoral incentives. This second eﬀect increases the set of parameters for which
interior equilibria are observed.
23In most cases signatures must be a fraction of the votes cast in the previous elections or a fraction of registered
voters
24For example, each county must have given at least some percentage of registered voters or past votes cast
23Figure 4: Equilibrium regions for q
As a result, an exogenous change in ρ can change the welfare ranking between direct and represen-
tative democracy. If, for a given set of parameters, direct democracy is welfare improving because
it allows to exploit complementarities, a higher ρ might make politicians too responsive to electoral
incentives, thereby triggering responsibility substitution.
6.3 Higher expected competence
In this section we examine the eﬀect of a change in q, the ex ante probability of a politician to
be incompetent. Inspecting the condition deﬁning f ∗and λ leads to conclude that q has an a
priori ambiguous eﬀect on both. To see this more clearly, consider Figure 4, which displays the
relationship between q and µ1,µ2, the threshold values for µ that deﬁne the three equilibrium
regions of the model. We can interpret µ1 as the smallest cost of initiative for which search matters
to voters and µ2 as the largest cost of initiative for which responsibility substitution arises.25
Search is maximized when µ = µ2 (that is when f = f and λ = 1) while it is zero for µ ≤ µ1.
Therefore, ﬁxing a value for µ (say, low enough to be below µ1 for some q) and letting q vary,
25The picture is also based on the assumption that
(1−¯ sN)¯ sN
(1−¯ sC)¯ sC < κ(0), which is guaranteed when ¯ sN > .5 or when
κ is a constant, and implies that µ1’s peak is to the right of µ2’s.
24one can see that there must be a non-monotonic relationship between q and search. For q high
enough the equilibrium is constrained. That means that further lowering q does not change search,
but only the probability of entry of the competent type because of the selection complementarity,
until the curve µ2 is crossed. Then responsibility substitution starts driving search down, until the
latter reaches zero, as µ1 is crossed. Eventually, while q keeps decreasing, µ1 is crossed again and
search starts increasing, as the responsibility substitution gets weaker. This dynamic lasts until µ2
is crossed again, and search, after reaching a peak, remains constant and the probability that the
competent type enters decreases.
Given that, let’s now consider how the eﬀect how introducing direct democracy (or lowering µ)
changes as q varies. When q is very close to ˆ q the range of µ in which the equilibrium remains
constrained is very large, which means that initiatives are beneﬁcial unless µ is very low. As q
gets larger though, the ranges of the interior and constrained equilibria get larger, thereby making
initiatives more likely to generate responsibility substitution eﬀects. Finally, as q approaches one,
the range of the constrained equilibrium starts increasing again. In short, responsibility substitution
is more likely to operate for moderate/low values of q rather than very high or very low.
The following proposition formalizes the graphical intuition of Figure 4.
Proposition 10 Both µ1 and µ2 are strictly quasiconcave in q with an interior maximizer.

























1 − ¯ sN
1 − q
 −1
their denominators are strictly quasiconvex in the relevant domain: therefore, they are both de-
creasing between 0 and their unique interior minimizer, and then increasing from there onwards.
Moreover, these denominators are also strictly positive in the whole domain of q. Since the recip-
rocal of a strictly quasiconvex function that is positive on a subset of Rn is strictly quasiconcave
on that subdomain, then µ1 and µ2 are both strictly quasiconcave functions, and their maximizer
must be the minimizer of their denominators. . ￿
The latter proposition implies that, as expected politicians’ competence goes from very low to
moderate, initiatives are more likely to be welfare decreasing, This result further supports the
idea that direct democracy is more likely to generate responsibility substitution when the political
environment is generally more favorable to citizens (that is, when on average politicians become
more competent).
25This analysis can suggest a mechanism for the losing popularity of direct democracy over time.
When initiatives were introduced at the state level (mostly in wester states), politicians were often
perceived as weak and controlled by large corporations. It is reasonable to suspect that politicians’
average competence has increased over the last century, because of better accountability mechanism
and improvements in the resources that politicians can access to deliver good policies to voters.26 To
turn such a vague intuition into a serious claim, one would need to support it with a strong empirical
analysis, which is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, we believe this comparative static
result points at a potential, an interesting, channel through which initiatives might have gradually
lost popularity as their beneﬁcial eﬀect over the last decades has weakened.
7 Related literature
Our model has a similar structure to the one of Besley and Smart (2007). In their public ﬁnance
model, voters use elections to discipline the incumbent and select “honest” politicians27 for the
second period. In our model, politicians diﬀer in their ability to acquire information and to provide
good policies. Information is endogenously acquired, rather than determined at the outset.
More broadly, our results contribute to the contracting literature on information acquisition.
Cr´ emer and Kahlil (1992), Cr´ emer at al (1998-(1)) and Cr´ emer and al. (1998-(2)) study diﬀerent
versions of a principal-agent model in which the agent’s information is endogenous and depends on
the contract proposed by the principal. Our paper focuses on the particular form of contracts likely
to arise in the context of political delegation, which features limited commitment and amendment
ability. Our contribution to this literature also includes a new condition (Assumption 2), diﬀerent
from the standard single crossing condition, under which an adverse shock on incentives (in our
context, a lower cost of initiatives) is magniﬁed by equilibrium eﬀects.
Our welfare result is also related to Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). Comparing the allocation of
power between a legislative body and a committee, they study the choice between the Restrictive
Amendment procedure and the Unrestrictive Procedure. Their model includes an information–
acquisition task, which is better performed when the legislature commits itself not to amend the
proposal of the committee, thereby raising the value of information. There is no adverse selection.
In the present comparison of direct democracy and representative democracy, Persson and Tabellini
(1994) show how electing a representative can help solving the credibility problem associated with
26This reasoning applies especially to complex, multidimensional issues where voters are likely not to be able to
use initiatives, which in our model are captured by the payoﬀ M.
27An honest politician sets a high tax rate only when the cost of providing the public good is high, which is its
private information, and never diverts public funds when the cost is low.
26dynamic capital taxation. In Loeper (2007) and Redoano and Scharf (2004), the two procedures
are compared in a setting with multiple districts and inter-jurisdictional externalities. In Redoano
and Scharf (2004) the representative serves as a commitment device for voters in diﬀerent districts
to credibly commit to a compromise policy. As a result, representative democracy is more likely
to deliver policy centralization than referenda. In Loeper (2007), direct democracy is immune
from strategic delegation problems, which makes it Pareto superior to representative democracy.
Maskin and Tirole (2004) ﬁnd that, when voters are uncertain enough about the optimal policy,
direct democracy is dominated by representative democracy. By contrast, our results do not rely
on any informational disadvantage of direct democracy compared to representative democracy.
Besley and Coate (2001) investigate the role of initiatives as “unbundling” institutions. Initiatives
allow citizens to reduce the number of issues that are bundled in the electoral competition through
candidates, thereby making the outcome likely to be closer to their preferences. This result holds
even in absence of any type of agency problem between voters and politicians. Boehmke and Patty
(2007) look at how proposed initiatives can play a role of informational cues: by the fact that a
certain measure was not enacted by the legislature and became an initiative, voters can infer that
the size and relevance of the set of losers of that measure is signiﬁcant, and use this information to
update their beliefs.
Finally, there is a large body of literature in political science on direct democracy institutions in
United States. Matsusaka (1992) and Matsusaka (2005) develop a theory, close to Boehmke and
Patty (2007), of the optimal allocation of policies between legislature and direct democracy. His
main ﬁnding, supported by empirical evidence, is that when a policy creates a substantial set of
losers, direct democracy is more likely (and more eﬀective) in tackling these issues, while elected
representative will prefer to adopt measures that are likely to beneﬁt most of the population. For
this reason, direct democracy institutions are welfare enhancing. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) is
closest to our paper. In that model, direct democracy and representative democracy may coexist.
Direct democracy introduces competition in the legislative process by giving amendment power
to an interest group over the policy chosen by and elected representative. Initiatives are usually
beneﬁcial and for that not to be the case, several conditions are needed: having the incumbent
aligned to voters but highly uncertain about voters’ preferences and an extreme interest group
which poses a signiﬁcant threat to the elected politician. In contrast, our results provides a rationale
for having positive costs, like participation quorums, associated with the proposal of an initiative
or a referendum.
278 Robustness
This section brieﬂy discusses which assumptions of the model can be relaxed without altering the
results. Although we not provide formal proofs, most of the extensions are straightforward.
Discount factor. If voters discount second-period utility by a factor β < 1, this does not aﬀect
their posterior threshold, which is only based on second-period utility. If politicians discount their
second-period payoﬀ, this is equivalent to reducing their rent from being reelected, and so this does
not aﬀect qualitatively the analysis. Overall, discounting second-period payoﬀs reduces equilibrium
search but does not qualitatively aﬀect the impact on welfare of direct democracy.
Initiatives in both periods. Allowing initiatives in the ﬁrst period, has no impact on the
equilibrium: it does not aﬀect voters’ threshold and politicians reelection incentives. However, it
does mitigate the impact of second-period direct democracy on politician’s ﬁrst-period eﬀort.
Symmetric direct democracy. If citizens can cancel a reform (i.e., move from x′ to x) this
does not aﬀect the analysis, given the signal structure, since in any natural equilibrium politicians
only implement the reform if it is optimal to do so. (Mathematically, (h,x′) does not arise in
equilibrium).
Symmetric signal structure. We considered the case where the incumbent’s signal about the
state has a symmetric structure: given eﬀort s, Pr[Learn h′ | ˜ h = h′,s] = Pr[Learn h | ˜ h = h,s] =
1+s
2 . Such model makes the analysis less tractable but does not aﬀect the qualitative nature of the
results.
Less extreme forms of learning-by-doing. Assuming that a reelected incumbent inherits only
a (possibly, type–dependent) fraction δθ of his ﬁrst–period search eﬀort does not aﬀect the results.
9 Conclusion
Direct democracy creates a responsibility substitution between citizens and politicians, and aﬀects
the agency problem between the two groups. The current expansion of direct democracy provisions,
in the United States and elsewhere, requires a careful analysis of such eﬀects. The present paper
shows how citizens’ lack of commitment power, combined with adverse selection and moral hazard,
can signiﬁcantly reduce the beneﬁts of direct democracy, and may even have an overall negative
impact on citizens’ welfare. Moreover, the negative impact is more likely to arise when elections
alone are relatively successful in addressing moral hazard and adverse selection. As a consequence,
while initiatives can partially improve the performance of a ’broken’ pure representative democracy,
28they also prevent citizens to beneﬁt from improvements in the political system. These phenomena
arise even when citizens have identical preferences, and in the absence of interest groups.
In our simple setting, where actions, states, and competence types are binary, we identiﬁed a novel
condition on cost functions, diﬀerent from the single-crossing property, under which electoral in-
centives and citizens ability to ﬁlter out competent politicians are monotonically related: stronger
electoral incentives reduce the probability that citizens oust a competent politician. This condition
has further implications. First, it guarantees uniqueness of a “natural equilibrium,” i.e., one in
which conditional on his information, an oﬃce-motivated politician chooses the welfare maximiz-
ing policy. Second, and perhaps more importantly, that condition generates a vicious circle: as
explained in Section 4, a lower cost of direct democracy raises voters’ posterior threshold to reelect
the incumbent, which can only be sustained, in equilibrium, by weaker electoral incentives (this is
where the condition enters), and lower search, which raises voters’ posterior threshold further, and
so forth.
In the parameter range where initiatives improve welfare, cheaper initiatives reduces, paradoxically,
the ex ante probability of observing them. Instead, when initiatives are welfare decreasing, the
relationship is either reversed or absent. This implication is empirically testable, and, as argued in
Section 6, most existing evidence available in United States in the last three decades (as shown in
various empirical contributions) suggests that various proxies for that cost (signature requirement
and geographic distribution requirements) and the frequency of initiatives are inversely related.
Our model abstracts from conﬂicts among voters and from the presence of interest groups. Earlier
models have shown that direct democracy provisions signiﬁcantly aﬀect the organization of interest
groups and their inﬂuence on policymaking. An interesting extension is to study the impact of
the responsibility substitution emphasized here on interest groups organization and inﬂuence. It
has been argued in the literature that direct democracy provisions can allow interest groups to
bring more competition in the policymaking process, and thereby improve the policy outcome. It
is an unclear question whether this result will be mirrored in a framework where information is
endogenous; our model may oﬀer a useful framework for investigating this issue.
29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5
i) Equivalently, we need to show that the ratio
1−sN(f)





N(0) = 0, we necessarily have T′′
C(0) < T′′
N(0), or κ(0) < 1.28 Since κ is decreasing
by assumption, this implies that κ is everywhere less than 1. Since sθ(f) = T′−1((1 − f)Rρ), we




C(f). Since κ is less than 1 and s′





Intuitively, reducing electoral incentives (i.e., increasing f) has a worse impact on the competent
type than on the incompetent one. The derivative of the ratio
1−sN(f)
1−sC(f) has the same sign as
−s′
N(f)(1 − sC(f)) + (1 − sN(f))s′
C(f).
As observed earlier, 1 − sN(f) > 1 − sC(f). Combined with s′
C(f) < s′
N(f) < 0, this implies that
this sign is negative.





θ( ˜ f)d ˜ f
and therefore
sC(f) − sN(f) =
  1
f
(1 − κ((1 − ˜ f)Rρ))(−s′
C( ˜ f))d ˜ f, (15)




C(f) for all f. Since κ is everywhere less than 1 and s′
C is negative, the
integrand in (15) is positive, which shows that sC(f) − sN(f) increases with the interval [f,1] of
integration and, therefore, decreases in f.
Proof of Proposition 6
i) The diﬀerence between EU(∆) and EU(µ) in an interior equilibrium is given by
DI(µ) = 2∆ρ[qsN(∆) + (1 − q)sC(∆)]+2M(1−q)−(∆−µ)ρ−(µ+∆)ρ[qsN(µ) + (1 − q)sC(µ)]−2M(1−q).
and the condition follows from computing that diﬀerence for µ = 0.
28We assume away the knife-edge case κ(0) = 1.
30ii) The The diﬀerence between EU(∆) and EU(µ) in a constrained equilibrium is given by
EU(∆) − EU(µ) =

     
     
2[q¯ sN + (1 − q)λ¯ sC]∆ρ + q(1 − q)M(λ − λ(µ))+
−(∆ − µ)ρ − [q¯ sN + (1 − q)λ(µ) ¯ sC](µ + ∆)ρ if µ ≥ µ2
2[[q¯ sN + (1 − q)λ¯ sC]∆ρ] − q(1 − q)M(1 − λ)+
−(∆ − µ)ρ − (∆ + µ)[ρqsN(µ) + (1 − q)sC(µ)] if µ < µ2
and the condition follows from computing that diﬀerence for µ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7













∂f < 0 and
df∗
dµ < 0.
This derivative has two components: the ﬁrst, −[q(1 − sN) + (1 − q)(1 − sC)] is negative while the
second, (µ + ∆)
df∗
dµ [qs′












N + (1 − q)s′
C]





N + (1 − q)s′
C] − [q(1 − sN) + (1 − q)(1 − sC)] > 0 (17)
then one has also proved (16).





(1 − sN)sNφ1 + (1 − sC)sCφ2
s′
N[2sNφ1 − φ1 − 1] + s′
C[2sCφ2 − φ2 + 1]
Therefore (17) is equivalent to
qs′
N + (1 − q)s′
C
s′
N[2sNφ1 − φ1 − 1] + s′
C[2sCφ2 − φ2 + 1]
>
[q(1 − sN) + (1 − q)(1 − sC)]
2(1 − sN)sNφ1 + 2(1 − sC)sCφ2
(18)






























  ≥ 0.






+ ˆ κ −











  ≥ 0
That is
[φ2 + φ1ˆ κ − 1 + ˆ κ] − 2sCφ2





  ≥ 0 (19)
Step 3 If κ is a constant, then κ = ν for all µ. Rearranging the inequality µ ≥ µ1, we obtain that
κ ≥ 1/2. Therefore, (18) simpliﬁes to
qκ + 1 − q
qκ2 + 1 − q
≥
qτ(µ) + 1 − q
2qκτ(µ) + 2(1 − q)
the right hand side of the former is then smaller than
qτ(µ) + 1 − q
2qκ2τ(µ) + κ(1 − q)
< 1.
As a result, the condition holds, since RHS > 1 > LHS.
Proof of Proposition 8
i) The ﬁrst part follows from the fact that below µ1 search stays constant at zero, since PI = ρ2.
In a constrained equilibrium, instead, the ex ante probability of observing an initiative is given by




FI(µ) = ρ[P′(1 + (1 − 2P)(1 − f)) − f′P(1 − P)]
where, using the same notation a before (recall that f′ = d





N − (1 − q)s′
C]f′ < 0. To get d
dµFI(µ) < 0 we then need
[−qs′
N − (1 − q)s′
C] >
P(1 − P)
1 + (1 − 2P)(1 − f)
(20)
which, depending on the shape of T and the value of f can hold or not.
Example in which (18) holds
For the standard quadratic case, TC(s) = Rρs2
2 , TN(s) = Rρs2 then we can prove that, since
ρf < P < 1
2ρ(1 + f)
[−qs′
N − (1 − q)s′






ρ(1 + f)(1 − ρf)
1 + 1 − ρ(1 + f)(1 − f)
>
P(1 − P)
1 + (1 − 2P)(1 − f)
32ii) If the equilibrium is constrained, the only equilibrium object which depends on µ is λ(µ). We
also know that λ(µ) is decreasing in µ. Therefore, we can simply look at the case in which the
incumbent is competent, since the behavior of the other type is independent of µ.
Given that the type is C, we have:
FC(µ) = [1 − λ(µ)]ρ + λ(µ)(1 − ¯ sC)ρ(1 − f) + (1 − λ(µ)(1 − ¯ sC)(1 − f)ρ)(1 − ¯ sC)ρ
taking its derivative yields d
dµPDD2
C = −λ′(µ)ρ[1 − (1 − ¯ sC)ρ(1 − f) + (1 − ¯ sC)2(1 − f)ρ] > 0.
The rest of the analysis (µ ≤ µ2) for this case is identical to part i).
Proof of Proposition 9
i) sθ(f;ρ) is increasing in ρ from (5) and convexity of the cost function.
The equilibrium reelection probability f∗ is the unique solution of the equation
F(f,ρ) = sN(f)[1 + φ1(ρ)] − s2
N(f)φ1(ρ) − sC(f)[1 − φ2(ρ)] − s2
C(f)φ2(ρ) = 0
The proof of Lemma 1 implies that F(·,ρ) has the single crossing property in f, being negative
below f∗ and positive above. Moreover,
∂F
∂ρ








which shows that F is increasing in ρ. Therefore, f∗(ρ) is decreasing in ρ.
ii) Simple inspection shows that µ1 is decreasing in ρ. To see that µ also decreases µ2, we ﬁrst





(1 − ¯ sC − (1 − ¯ sC)f)
ρ((1 − ¯ sC)f)
> 0.
This implies that ¯ sN and ¯ sC are decreasing in ρ, while ¯ sN
¯ sC is increasing in ρ. Therefore, the
numerator entering the deﬁnition of µ2, 1 −
¯ sN









(1 − ¯ sN)
 
,
increases in ρ, concluding the proof.
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